A pawn in the US-China chess game? Why the US strategy in Southeast Asia is problematic | New perspectives on Asia

In addition, in recent years, the United States has largely focused its diplomatic efforts on countries that are strategically important to China. In this regard, the United States pays significant attention to bilateral cooperation. attention Vietnam and the Philippines due to both countries’ current tensions with China in the South China Sea. While it is necessary to engage with countries in strategic locations, merely stepping up diplomatic efforts to match China when Beijing steps up its own activities may not create sustainable partnerships. Washington, in particular, did not bolster ties with Cambodia until the prolonged deployment of two Chinese vessels at the Ream naval base raised issues. concerns on China’s continued military presence in Cambodia. Two months after Ream’s reports, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin paid tribute to the Chinese. visit to Cambodia, to test the future of China-Cambodia relations.

This approach is problematic, as America’s strategic interests are defined by China’s. Given China’s unpredictable foreign policy, the United States cannot know in advance which countries or regions will fall under China’s orbit in the future. It will also be ineffective for the United States to initiate meaningful engagements with a country only after China has already consolidated its influence. This game of catch-up can also be seen in the Pacific Islands, a region that Washington has long overlooked. Amid concerns about the region’s growing ties with China, the United States has made up for its absence with an increased Chinese presence abroad. diplomatic presence and economic cooperationDespite recent efforts, some Pacific leaders still view The US has received unfavorable criticism, condemning Washington for its lack of sincerity in its commitments to the region. Similarly, this catch-up strategy, driven by a “competition” mentality, may also bring more harm than good to US credibility in Southeast Asia.

Viewing Southeast Asia primarily in the context of US-China competition is also detrimental to public and elite support for the United States in the region. Singapore’s then Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong emphasized In 2023, ASEAN does not want to take sides and has expressed its desire to strengthen ties with both the United States and China. 76 percent A study by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute showed that ASEAN member states could be used as proxies for great powers amid competition. Therefore, perpetuating a narrative of US-China rivalry while discussing US actions in Southeast Asia fuels this fear. This narrative also hampers support from Southeast Asian publics as it strips the region’s states of agency and sovereignty, increasing the perception that countries in the region are just pawns in the US-China geopolitical chess game.

Moving away from the US-China competition framework: a toolkit

If the United States were to refrain from adopting a “competition” mindset, it could foster a comprehensive U.S.-ASEAN partnership to boost its soft power in the region. The United States should establish more holistic economic and diplomatic engagements with countries in the region. Instead of a reactive policy that relies on China’s strategic interests and attempts to outdo it in its own comfort zone, U.S. economic activities in the region should leverage U.S. competitive advantages. By reorienting investments in critical infrastructure and minerals toward U.S.-dominated sectors such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, high-value chain technology, and financial services, the United States can establish unique specialties without compromising its economic ties with Southeast Asia. The United States should also rely on its long-standing allies to lead investments in sectors in which it is behind China. For example, Japan specializes in infrastructure investments, while the European Union is a pioneer in green development.

In addition, the US diplomatic presence is currently insufficient in Southeast Asia. President Joe Biden’s decision to hop Major regional meetings in 2023 call into question America’s commitment to ASEAN. While limited human and financial resources may prevent the United States from conducting bilateral visits to all Southeast Asian states, Washington should demonstrate good faith efforts to the international community. U.S. leaders can leverage multilateral diplomatic channels, such as the Special US-ASEAN Summithe ASEAN Summitand the East Asia Summit To further foster ties in the region, participating in key regional debates is an effective way to express the U.S. position on issues of mutual interest and to show respect for regional leaders.

In addition to establishing more comprehensive alliances in the region, the United States should be consistent with its discourse that countries are free to choose their own paths. Under the Trump administration, Narratives The US-China competition has focused on comparing a US-led “free and open” future with a “repressive” international order dominated by China. This rhetoric presents Southeast Asian countries with a binary choice: distance themselves from Beijing or accept an autocratic world order. However, Biden’s rhetoric has shown that oppositeBiden highlights the freedom of Southeast Asian countries to choose their partners and reaffirms that the United States respects each country’s autonomy in foreign policy. Although Biden’s speech attempts to reassure the region, inconsistent approaches could undermine The region’s trust in US commitments. By not forcing Southeast Asia to choose sides, Washington can increase its normative power in the region. With a possible change of government following the upcoming November elections, the United States should reassess its foreign policy approach toward Southeast Asia to gain the trust and respect of its partners in the region.

Giang Pham is a research intern in the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.